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4.1  Introduction 
It has long been recognized that economic policy in general, and monetary 
policy in particular, needs a forward-looking dimension.  “If we wait until a 
price movement is actually afoot before applying remedial measures, we may 
be too late,” as Keynes (1923) observes in A Tract on Monetary Reform. That 
same constraint still faces the current generation of  monetary policymakers. 
Alan  Greenspan’s Humphrey-Hawkins  testimony  in  1994 summarizes  the 
monetary policy problem thus: “The challenge of monetary policy is to inter- 
pret current data on the economy and financial markets with an eye to antici- 
pating future inflationary forces and to countering them by  taking action in 
advance.” Or in the words of Donald Kohn (1995) at the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System: “Policymakers cannot avoid looking into the 
future.” Empirically estimated reaction  functions suggest that policymakers’ 
actions match these words. Monetary policy in the G-7 countries appears in 
recent years to have been driven more by  anticipated future than by  lagged 
actual outcomes (Clarida and Gertler 1997; Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1998; 
Orphanides 1998). 
But how  best is this forward-looking  approach made operational? Fried- 
man’s (1959) Program for Monetary Stability cast doubt on whether it could 
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be. Likening economic forecasting to weather forecasting, he observes: “Lean- 
ing today against next year’s wind is hardly an easy task in the present state of 
meteorology.” Yet this is just the task present-day monetary policymakers have 
set themselves: in effect, long-range weather forecasting in a stochastic world 
of  time-varying lags and coefficients. That is a tough nut to crack even for 
meteorologists. It is not altogether surprising, then, that solving the equivalent 
problem in a monetary policy context has met with different solutions among 
central banks. 
The more innovative among these solutions have recently been adopted by 
countries targeting inflation directly. These countries now include New Zea- 
land, Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, Australia, and Spain (see 
Haldane 1995; Leiderman and Svensson 1995). In the first three of these coun- 
tries, monetary policy is based on explicit (and in some cases published) infla- 
tion forecasts.’ These forecasts are the de facto intermediate or feedback vari- 
able for monetary policy (Svensson 1997a, 1997b; Haldane 1997). The aim of 
this paper is to evaluate that particular approach to the general problem of the 
need for forward-lookingness in monetary policy. 
This is done by evaluating a class of simple policy rules that feed back from 
expected values of future inflation-inflation-forecast-based  rules. These rules 
are simple, and so are analogous to the Taylor rule specifications that have 
recently been extensively discussed in an academic and policy-making context. 
Because they are forecast based, the rules mimic (albeit imperfectly) monetary 
policy behavior among inflation-targeting central banks in practice.2  And de- 
spite their simplicity, these forecast-based rules have  a number of  desirable 
features, which mean they may approximate the optimal feedback rule. 
The class of  forecast-based rules that we consider take the following ge- 
neric form: 
(1) 
where rr denotes the short-term ex ante real rate of  interest, rr =  if -  E,IT~+~, 
where  i, are nominal interest rates; r:  denotes the equilibrium value of  real 
interest rates; Ef(.)  =  E(.  I @J,  where @,  is the information set available at time 
t and E is the mathematical expectations operator; IT,  is inflation (T,  =  p; - 
p;-,, where pf is the log of the consumer price index); and  IT*  is the inflation 
target.3 
According to the rule, the monetary  authorities control deterministically 
nominal interest rates (if) so as to hit a path for the short-term real interest rate 
q  =  + (1 - r>rF  +  0(E,7~,+,  - IT*), 
1. In the other inflation-targeting countries, inflation forecasts are sometimes less explicit but 
nevertheless a fundamental part of the monetary policy process. 
2. We discuss below the places in which the forecast-based rules we consider deviate from real- 
world inflation targeting. 
3. The rule could be augmented with other-e.g.,  explicit output-terns.  We do so below. This 
then takes us close to the reaction function specification found by  Clarida et al. (1998) to match 
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(r,).  Short real rates are in turn set relative to some steady state value, deter- 
mined by a weighted combination of lagged and equilibrium real interest rates. 
The novel feature of  the rule, however, is the feedback term. Deviations of 
expected inflation (the feedback variable) from the inflation target (the policy 
goal) elicit remedial policy actions. 
The policy  choice variables for the authorities are the parameter triplet 
{j,  0, y}. The parameter y dictates the degree of interest rate smoothing (see 
Williams 1997). So, for example, with y = 0 there is no instrument smoothing. 
The parameter 0 is a policy feedback parameter. Higher values of  0 imply a 
more aggressive policy response for a given deviation of the inflation forecast 
from its target. Finally, j is the targeting horizon of  the central bank when 
forming its forecast. For example, in the United Kingdom the Bank of England 
feeds back from an  inflation forecast around two years ahead (King 1997).4 
The horizon of the inflation forecast (j)  and the size of the feedback coefficient 
(0), as well as the degree of  instrument smoothing (7). dictate the speed at 
which inflation is brought back to target following inflationary disturbances. 
Because they influence the inflationary transition path, these policy parameters 
clearly also have a bearing on output dynamics. 
As defined in equation (I), inflation targeting amounts to a well-defined 
monetary policy rule. That view is not at odds with Bernanke and Mishkin’s 
( 1997) characterization of inflation targeting as “constrained discretion.” There 
is ample scope for discretionary input into any rule-equation  (1) particularly 
so. These discretionary choices include the formation of the inflation expecta- 
tion itself and the choice of the parameter set {j,  8, T*}.  They mean that equa- 
tion (1) does not fall foul of the critique of inflation targeting made by Fried- 
man  and Kuttner (1996): that it is rigid as a monetary  strategy and hence 
destined to the same failures as, for example, strict monetary targeting. 
This is fine as an intuitive description of  a forecast-based policy rule such 
as rule (1). But what, if any, theoretical justification do these rules have? And, 
in particular, why might they be preferred to, for example, Taylor rules? Sev- 
eral authors have recently argued that, in certain settings, expected-inflation- 
targeting rules  have  desirable properties  (inter alia, King  1997; Svensson 
1997a, 1997b; Haldane 1998). For example, in Svensson’s model (1997a), the 
optimal rule when the authorities care only about inflation is one that sets inter- 
est rates so as to bring expected inflation into line with the inflation target at 
some horizon (“strict” inflation-forecast targeting). When the authorities care 
also about output, the optimal rule is to less than fully close any gap between 
expected inflation and the inflation target  (“flexible” inflation-forecast tar- 
geti~~g).~ 
The rules we consider here differ from those in Svensson (1997a) in that 
4. This comparison is not exact because j  defines the feedback horizon under the rule, whereas 
in practice in the United Kingdom two years refers to the policy horizon (the point at which ex- 
pected inflation and the inflation target are in line). 
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they are simple feedback rules for the policy instrument, rather than compli- 
cated optimal targeting rules. Simple feedback rules have  some clear advan- 
tages. First, they are directly analogous to, and so comparable with, the other 
policy rule specifications discussed in the papers in this volume, including Tay- 
lor rules. Second, simple rules are arguably more robust when there is uncer- 
tainty about the true structure of the economy. And third, simple rules may be 
advantageous on credibility and monitorability grounds (Taylor 1993). The last 
of these considerations is perhaps the most important in a policy context, for 
one way to interpret the output from these rules is as a cross-check on actual 
policy in real time. For that to be practical, any rule needs to be simple and 
monitorable by outside agents. 
At the same time, the simple forecast-based rules we consider do have some 
clear  similarities with  Svensson’s optimal inflation-forecast-targeting rules. 
Monetary policy under both rules seeks to offset deviations between expected 
inflation  and  the inflation  target at  some horizon.6 More concretely, even 
simple forecast-based specifications can be considered “encompassing” rules, 
in the following respects: 
Lag Encompassing. The lag between the enactment of monetary policy and its 
first effects on inflation and output are well known and widely documented. 
The monetary authorities need to be conscious of  these lags when framing 
policy; they need to be able to calibrate them reasonably accurately; and they 
then need to embody them in the design of their policy rules. Without this, 
monetary policy will always be acting after the point at which it can hope to 
head off incipient inflationary pressures. Such myopic policy may itself then 
become a source of cyclical (in particular, inflation) instability, for the very 
reasons outlined by Friedman (1959).’ 
By judicious choice ofj, the lead term on expected inflation in equation (l), 
simple forecast-based rules can be designed so as to embody automatically 
these transmission lags. In particular, the feedback variable in the rule can be 
chosen so that it is directly under the control of the monetary authorities- 
inflation j periods hence. The policymakers’ feedback and control variables are 
then explicitly aligned. Transmission lags are the most obvious (but not the 
only) reason why monetary policy needs a forward-looking, preemptive di- 
mension. Embedding these lags in a formal forecast-based rule is simple recog- 
nition of that fact.8 Reflecting this, lag encompassing was precisely the motiva- 
6. In particular, since the rules we consider allow flexibility over both the forecast horizon (j) 
and the feedback parameter (6)-both  of which affect output stabilization-their  closest analogue 
is Svensson’s flexible inflation-forecast-targeting rule. 
7. Former vice-chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Blinder observes: “Failure to take proper 
account of lags is, I believe, one of the main sources of central bank error’’ (1997). 
8. Svensson (1997a) shows, in the context of his model, that rules with this lag-encompassing 
feature secure the minimum variance of inflation precisely because they guard against monetary 
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tion behind targeting expected inflation in those countries where this was first 
adopted: New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom. 
Information Encompassing. Under inflation-forecast-based rules, the inflation 
expectation in rule (1) can be thought of as the intermediate variable for mone- 
tary policy. It is well suited to this task when judged against the three classical 
requirements of any intermediate variable: it is controllable, predictable, and a 
leading indicator. Expected inflation is, almost by definition, the indicator most 
closely correlated with the future value of the variable of interest. In particular, 
expected inflation ought to embody all information contained within the myr- 
iad indicators that affect the future path of inflation. Forecast-based rules are, 
in  this  sense, information encompassing. That is not  a feature necessarily 
shared by  backward-looking policy rules-for  example, those considered in 
the volume by Bryant, Hooper, and Mann (1993). 
Of course, any forward-looking  rule can be given a backward-looking repre- 
sentation and respecified in terms of current and previously dated variables. 
For example, in the aggregate-demandaggregate-supply model of  Svensson 
(1997a), the optimal forward-looking rule can be rewritten as a Taylor rule- 
albeit with weights on the output gap and inflation that are likely to be very 
different from one-half. But that will not necessarily be the case in more gen- 
eral settings where shocks come not just from output and prices. Taylor-type 
rules will tend then to feed back from a restrictive subset of information vari- 
ables and so will not in general be 0ptima1.~  By contrast, inflation-forecast- 
based rules will naturally embody all information contained in the inflation 
reduced-form of the model: extra lags of existing predetermined variables and 
additional predetermined variables, both of which would typically also enter 
the optimal feedback rule. For that reason even simple forecast-based rules are 
likely to take us close to the optimal state-contingent rule-or  at least closer 
than Taylor-type rule specifications. 
Output Encompassing. As specified in equation (l),  inflation-forecast-based 
rules appear to take no explicit account of output objectives. The inflation tar- 
get, n*,  defines the nominal anchor, and there is no explicit regard for output 
stabilization. But T* is not the only policy choice parameter in equation (1). 
The targeting horizon (j)  and feedback parameter @)--the  two remaining 
policy choice variables-can  in principle also help to secure a degree of out- 
put smoothing. These parameters can be chosen to ensure that an inflation- 
forecast-based rule better reflects  the  authorities’ preferences in  situations 
where they care about output as well as inflation variability. To see how these 
policy parameters affect output stabilization, consider separately shocks to de- 
mand and supply. 
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In the case of demand shocks, inflation and output stabilization will in most 
instances be mutually compatible. Demand shocks shift output and inflation in 
the same direction relative to their baseline values. So there need not then be 
any inherent trade-off between output and inflation stabilization in the setting 
of  monetary policy following these shocks. A rule such as equation (1) will 
automatically secure a degree of output stabilization in a world of just demand 
shocks. Or, put differently, because it is useful for predicting future inflation, 
the output gap already appears implicitly in an inflation-forecast-based rule 
such as equation (1). 
For supply shocks, trade-offs between output and inflation stability are more 
likely because they will tend then to be shifted in opposite directions. But in- 
flation targeting does not imply that the authorities are opting for a corner 
solution on the output-inflation variability trade-off curve in these situations. 
For example, different inflation forecast horizons-different  values ofj-will 
imply different points on the output-inflation variability frontier. Longer fore- 
cast horizons smooth the transition of inflation back to target following infla- 
tion shocks, in part because policy then accommodates (rather than offsets) the 
first-round effects of any supply shocks.10  The feedback coefficient (8)  also has 
a bearing on output dynamics, for much the same reason. So a central bank 
following an inflation-forecast-based rule can, in principle, simply choose its 
policy parameters {j,  8, y} so as to achieve a preferred point on the output- 
inflation variability spectrum. Certainly, the simple forecast-based policy rule 
(1) ought not to be the sole preserve of monomaniacal inflation fighters. 
This paper aims to put some quantitative flesh onto this conceptual skeleton. 
It evaluates simple forecast-based rules against the three encompassing criteria 
outlined above.” The type of policy questions this then enables us to address 
include: What is the optimal degree of policy forward-lookingness?  And what 
does this depend on? Can inflation-only rules secure sufficient output smooth- 
ing? How do simple forecast-based rules compare with the fully optimal rule? 
And with simple Taylor rules? 
To  summarize our conclusions up front, we find quantitative support for all 
10. This is broadly the practice followed in the United Kingdom. The Bank of  England is re- 
quired to write an open letter to the Chancellor in the event of inflation deviating by  more than  1 
percentage point from its target, stating the horizon over which inflation is to be brought back to 
heel. Longer horizons might be chosen following large or persistent supply shocks, so that policy 
does not disturb output too much en route back to the inflation target. That is important because 
the United Kingdom’s inflation target, while giving primacy to price stability, also requires that 
the Bank of  England take account of output and employment objectives when setting monetary 
policy. Other design features of inflation targets can ensure a sufficient degree of output stabiliza- 
tion. E.g.,  in New Zealand there are inflation target exemptions for “significant” supply shocks 
(see Mayes and Chapple 1995); while in Canada there is a larger inflation fluctuation margin to 
help insulate against shocks (see Freedman 1996). 
11. Previous empirical simulation studies that have considered the performance  of  forward- 
looking rules  include Black et al.  (1997), Clark, Laxton,  and Rose (1995), and Brouwer  and 
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three of the encompassing propositions. Because inflation-forecast-based pol- 
icy rules embody transmission lags, they generally help improve inflation con- 
trol (lag encompassing). These rules can be designed to smooth the path of 
output as well as inflation, despite not feeding back from the former explicitly 
(output encompassing). And inflation-forecast-based  rules deliver clear wel- 
fare improvements over Taylor-type rules, which respond to a restrictive subset 
of information variables (information encompassing). 
The paper is planned as follows. Section 4.2 outlines our model. Section 4.3 
calibrates  this model  and conducts some deterministic experiments with it. 
Section 4.4 uses stochastic analysis to evaluate the three conceptual properties 
of  forecast-based rules-lag  encompassing, information  encompassing, and 
output encompassing-outlined  above. Section 4.5 briefly summarizes. 
4.2  The Model 
To evaluate equation (I), and variants of it, we use a small open economy, 
log-linear calibrated rational expectations macromodel. It has similarities with 
the optimizing IS-LM framework recently developed by McCallum and Nel- 
son (forthcoming) and Svensson (forthcoming), and hence indirectly with the 
stochastic general equilibrium models of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and 
Goodfriend and King (1  997). The open economy dimension is important when 
characterizing the behavior of  inflation-targeting countries, which tend to be 
just such small open economies (see Blake and Westaway  1996; Svensson, 
forthcoming). The exchange rate also has an important bearing  on output- 
inflation dynamics in our model, in keeping with the results of Ball (chap. 3 
of  this volume). Having a pseudostructural model is important too, given the 
susceptibility of counterfactual policy simulations to Lucas critique problems. 
The model is kept deliberately small to ease the computational burden. But 
a compact model is also useful in helping clarify the transmission mechanism 
channels at work and the trade-offs that naturally arise among them. And de- 
spite its size, the model embodies the key features of the small forecasting 
model used by the Bank of England for its inflation projections. The model is 
calibrated  to match  the dynamic path  of  output and inflation generated by 
structural and reduced-form models of the United Kingdom economy in the 
face of various shocks. 
The model comprises six behavioral relationships,  listed as equations (2) 
through (7) below: 
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(7) 
All variables, except interest rates, are in logarithms. Importantly, in the simu- 
lations all behavioral relationships are also expressed as deviations from equi- 
librium. So, for example, we set the (log) natural rate of output, yr*, equal to 
zero. We also normalize to zero the (log) foreign price level and foreign interest 
rate, pf‘ = i:  = 0, and the (implicit) markup in equation (5) and foreign ex- 
change risk premium in equation (4). 
Equation (2) is a standard IS curve, with real output, y,,  depending nega- 
tively on the ex ante real interest rate and the real exchange rate (where e, is 
the foreign currency price of domestic currency), {a3,  a4}  < 0. The former 
channel is defined over short rather than long real interest rates. We could have 
included a long-term interest rate in our model, linking long and short rates 
through an arbitrage condition, as in Fuhrer and Moore’s (1995a) model of the 
United States. But in the United Kingdom, unlike in the United States, ex- 
penditure is more sensitive to short than to long interest rates, owing to the 
prevalence of floating-rate debt instruments. 
Output also depends on lags of itself, reflecting adjustment costs and, more 
interestingly, a lead term. The latter of  these is motivated by  McCallum and 
Nelson’s  (forthcoming) work on the form of the reduced-form IS curve that 
arises from a fully optimizing general equilibrium macromodel. We  experi- 
ment with this lead term below, even though we do not use it in our baseline 
simulations. The term q,  is a vector of demand shocks, for example, shocks to 
foreign output and fiscal policy. 
Equation (3) is an LM curve.I2 Its arguments are conventional: a nominal 
interest rate, capturing portfolio balance, and real output, capturing transac- 
tions demand.I3  The term E~,  is a vector of velocity shocks. Equation (4) is an 
uncovered interest parity condition. We  do not include any explicit foreign 
exchange risk premium. The shock vector E~~  comprises foreign interest rate 
shocks and other noise in the foreign exchange market, including shocks to the 
exchange risk premium. 
Equations (5) and (6) define the model’s supply side. They take a similar 
form to that of  other staggered contract m0de1s.l~  Equation (5)  is a markup 
equation. Domestic output prices (in logs, p:) are a constant markup  over 
weighted average contract wages (in logs, w,)  in the current and preceding peri- 
12. This is largely redundant in our analysis since we are focusing on interest rate rules that 
13. McCallum  and Nelson (forthcoming)  show that this form of  the LM curve can also be 
14. In particular, they are similar to those recently developed by Fuhrer and Moore (1995a) for 
assume that the demand for money is always fully accommodated at unchanged interest rates. 
derived as the reduced form of an optimizing stochastic general equilibrium model. 
the United States. For an early formulation of such model, see Buiter and Jewitt (1981). 165  Forward-Looking Rules for Monetary Policy 
ods. Equation (6) is the wage-contracting equation. Under this specification, 
wage contracts last two periods.15  Agents in today’s wage cohort bargain over 
relative real consumption wages. Today’s real contract wage is some weighted 
average of  the real contract wage of  the “other” cohort of  workers: that is, 
wages already agreed upon in the previous period and those expected to be 
agreed upon in the next period. We  do not impose symmetry on the lag and 
lead terms in the contracting equation, as in the standard Fuhrer and Moore 
(1995b) model. Instead we allow a flexible mixed lag-lead specification, which 
nests more restrictive alternatives as a special case (see Blake 1996; Blake and 
Westaway  1996). This flexible mixed specification is found in Fuhrer (1997) 
to be preferred empirically. It also allows us to experiment with the degree of 
forward-lookingness in the wage-bargaining process. The lag-lead weights are 
restricted to sum to unity, however, to preserve price homogeneity in the wage- 
price system (a vertical long-run Phillips curve). Also in the wage-contracting 
equation is a conventional output gap term, capturing tightness in the labor 
market. The shock vector, E~,,  can be thought to capture disturbances to the 
natural rate of output and similar such supply shocks. 
This relative  wage-price specification has both  theoretical and empirical 
attractions. Its theoretical appeal comes from work as early as Duesenbeny 
(1 949), which argued that wage relativities were a key consideration when en- 
tering the wage bargain. The empirical appeal of the relative real wage formu- 
lation is that it generates inflation persistence. This is absent from a conven- 
tional two-period Taylor (1980) contracting specification (Fuhrer and Moore 
1995a; Fuhrer 1997), which instead produces price level persistence.16  Equa- 
tion (7) defines the consumption price index, comprising domestic goods (with 
weight +) and imported foreign goods (with weight 1 -  +).I7  Note that equa- 
tion (7) implies full and immediate passthrough of  import prices (and hence 
exchange rate changes) into consumption prices-an  assumption we discuss 
further below. 
Some manipulation of  equations (5), (6), and (7) gives the reduced-form 
Phillips curve of the model: 
where c, =  e, -  p; (the real exchange rate), p. = 2(1 -  +), A is the backward 
difference operator, and E,,  =  E~,  + x,[(p; -  E,-,p;) -  (w,  -  Er-lwr)l,  where 
the composite error now includes expectational errors by wage bargainers. 
15. We could have lengthened the contracting lag-cg.,  to four periods, which in our calibra- 
tion is one year-to  better match real-world behavior. But two lags appeared to be sufficient to 
generate the inflation persistence  evident in  the data, when taken together with the degree of 
backward-lookingness embodied in the Phillips curve. 
16. As  Roberts (1995) discusses, Taylor contracting can deliver inflation persistence if, e.g., 
expectations are made “not quite rational.” Certainly, a variety of mechanisms other than the one 
adopted here would have allowed us to introduce inflation persistence into the model. 
17. With the foreign price level normalized to zero in logs. 166  Nicoletta Batini and Andrew G. Haldane 
Equation (8) is the open economy analogue of Fuhrer and Moore’s (1995a) 
Phillips curve specification (see Blake and Westaway  1996). The inflation 
terms-a  weighted backward- and forward-looking average-are  the same as 
in the closed economy case. There is inflation persistence. The specification 
differs because of  additional (real) exchange rate terms, reflecting the price 
effects  of  exchange rate  changes  on  imported  goods in  the  consumption 
basket. 
The transmission of monetary impulses in this model is very different from 
the closed economy case, in terms of size and timing of the effects: we illus- 
trate these effects below.  There is a conventional real  interest rate channel, 
working through the output gap and thence onto inflation. But in addition there 
is a real exchange rate effect, operating through two distinct channels. First, 
there is an indirect output gap route running through net exports and thence 
onto inflation. And second, there are direct price effects via the cost of  im- 
ported consumption goods and via wages and hence output prices. The latter 
channel means that  disinflation policies have  a speedy effect on consumer 
prices (p;),  if not on domestically generated prices (pf)-see  Svensson (forth- 
coming). This direct exchange rate channel thus has an important bearing on 
consumer price inflation and output dynamics, which we illustrate below. Be- 
cause these direct exchange rate effects derive from the (potentially restrictive) 
assumption of  full and immediate passthrough of  exchange rate changes to 
consumption prices, however, we also experiment below with a model where 
passthrough is sluggish or incomplete. This specification might be more realis- 
tic if, for example, we believe that foreign exporters “price to market,” holding 
the foreign currency prices of their exported goods relatively constant in the 
face of exchange rate changes, or if home-country retail importers absorb the 
effects of exchange rate changes in their margins. 
The model (2)-(7)  is clearly not structural in the sense that we can back out 
directly from its taste and technology parameters. Nevertheless, as McCallum 
and Nelson (forthcoming) have recently shown, a system such as (2)-(7)  can 
be derived as the linear reduced-form of a fully optimizing general equilibrium 
model, under certain specifications of tastes and technology. That ought to con- 
fer some degree of policy invariance on model parameters-and  hence some 
immunity from the Lucas critique. 
4.3  Deterministic Policy Analysis 
4.3.1  Calibrating the Model 
To assess the properties of the model described above, we begin with some 
deterministic simulations. For this we need to calibrate the behavioral parame- 
ters in equations (2)  through (7). As far as possible, we set our baseline cali- 
18. Plus the effects of  the composite error term. 167  Forward-Looking Rules for Monetary Policy 
brated values in line with prior empirical estimates on quarterly data. Where 
this is not possible-for  example, in the wage-contracting equation-we  Cali- 
brate parameters to ensure a plausible dynamic profile from impulse responses. 
We  also experiment below, however, with some deviations from the baseline 
parameterization, in particular the degree of forward-lookingness  in the model. 
For the IS curve (2),  we  set a, = 0.8, which is empirically plausible on 
quarterly data. For the moment we set a2  = 0, ignoring until later any direct 
forward-lookingness in the IS curve. We  set the real interest rate (a3)  and real 
exchange rate (a,) elasticities to -0.5  and -0.2,  respectively. Both are in line 
with empirical estimates from the Bank of England‘s forecasting model. For 
the LM curve we set PI  = 1 and p,  = 0.5, so that money is unit income elastic 
and has an interest semielasticity of  one-half. Both of  these restrictions are 
broadly satisfied on U.K. data (Thomas 1996). 
On the contracting equation (6), our baseline model sets xo  = 0.2, so that 
contracting is predominantly backward looking. This specification matches the 
pattern of the data much better than an equally weighted formulation, both in 
the United States (Fuhrer 1997) and in the United Kingdom (Blake and Westa- 
way  1996).19  The output sensitivity of real wages is set at 0.2 (x,  = 0.2), in line 
with previous studies.*O We  set +I,  the share of domestically produced goods in 
the consumption basket, equal to 0.8, in line with existing shares. 
Turning to the policy rule (l), for consistency with the model this is also 
simulated as a deviation from equilibrium. That is, we  set IT* (the inflation 
target) and r:  (the equilibrium real rate) to zero. Because of this, our simula- 
tions do not address questions regarding the optimal level of IT*.  For example, 
our model does not broach issues such as the stabilization difficulties caused 
by the nonnegativity of nominal interest rates. We are implicitly assuming that 
the level of T*  has been set such that this constraint binds with only a negli- 
gibly small probability. Nor do we address issues such as time variation in r:. 
In terms of the parameter triplet {j,  8, y}, in our baseline rule we set y = 
0.5-a  halfway house between the two extreme values of interest rate smooth- 
ing we consider; 8 = 0.5-around  the middle of the range of feedback parame- 
ters used in previous simulation studies (Taylor 1993a; McCallum 1988; Black 
et al. 1997); andj = 8 periods. Because the model is calibrated to match quar- 
terly profiles for the endogenous variables, this final assumption is equivalent 
to targeting the quarterly inflation rate two years ahead. This is around the 
horizon from which central banks feed back in practice. For example, the Bank 
of England’s “policy rule” has been characterized as targeting the inflation rate 
two years or so ahead (King 1996).2L 
19. The lag-lead weights chosen here are very similar to those found empirically in the United 
20. The elasticity of real wages is close to that found by  Fuhrer ( 1997) in the United States 
21. Though the United Kingdom’s inflation target is defined as an annual percentage change in 
States by Fuhrer (1997). 
of 0.12. 
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Because the model (2)-(7)  and the baseline policy rule (1) are log-linear, we 
can solve the system using the method of Blanchard and Kahn (1980). Denote 
the vector of endogenous variables z,.~~  The model (1)-(7)  has a convenient 
state-space representation, 
(9)  [ “+’ ] =  A[::]  +  BE,, 
ElXt+l 
where q, is a vector containing z,-~  and its lags, x, is a vector containing z,, 
E1zt+,,  E*Z~+~,  and so forth, and, as usual, El is the expectations operator using 
information up to time t. The solution to equation (9) is obtained by  imple- 
menting the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) method with a standard computer 
program that solves linear rational expectations models.23  This program im- 
poses the condition that there are no explosive solutions, implying a relation- 
ship E,X,+~  + Nq,,,  = 0, where [N I] is the set of  eigenvectors of the stable 
eigenvalues of A. 
We  then evaluate the various rules by conducting stochastic policy simula- 
tions and calculating in each case unconditional moments of the endogenous 
variables. To  conduct the  simulations we  need  a covariance matrix of  the 
shocks for the exogenous variables. 
There are a variety of  ways  of  generating these shocks. The theoretical 
model (2)-(7)  does not have enough dynamic structure to believe that its em- 
pirically estimated residuals are legitimate measures of primitive shocks. Alter- 
natively, and at the other end of the spectrum, we could use atheoretic time 
series or vector autoregression (VAR) models to construct structural shocks. 
But that approach is not without problems either. Identification restrictions are 
still required to unravel the structural shocks from the reduced-form VAR  re- 
siduals. Because these restrictions are just-identifying, they are nontestable. 
Further, in the VAR  literature these restrictions usually include orthogonality 
of the primitive disturbances, E,(Eitej,’)  = 0 for all i # j.  That is not a restriction 
we would want necessarily to impose a pri~ri.~~ 
We  steer a middle course between these alternatives, using  a covariance 
matrix of structural shocks derived from the Bank of  England’s forecasting 
This confers some advantages. First, and importantly, our analytical 
model can be considered a simplified version of this forecasting model, only 
without its dynamic structure. This lends some coherence to the deterministic 
and stochastic parts of  the analysis. Second, the structural shocks from the 
forecasting model permit nonzero covariances. 
For IS, LM, and Phillips curve shocks, we simply take the moments of the 
22. Boldface denotes vectors and matrices. 
23. This was conducted within the ACESPRISM solution software (Gaines, Al’Nowaihi, and 
24. Though see Leeper,  Sims, and Zha (1996). Black et al. (1997) generate identified VAR 
25. This matrix is available from the authors on request. 
Levine 1989). 
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residuals from the Bank’s forecasting model over the sample period  1989:  1- 
97:3. Our sample period excludes most of the 1970s and 1980s, during which 
time the variance of shocks for all of the variables was (sometimes consider- 
ably) higher. Using a longer sample period would rescale upward the variances 
we report. The exchange rate is trickier. For that, we use quarterly Money Mar- 
ket Services Inc. survey data to capture exchange rate expectations over our 
sample, using the dollar-pound  exchange  rate as our benchmark.26 The ex- 
change rate residuals were then constructed from the arbitrage condition (4), 
plugging in the survey expectations and using quarterly data for the other vari- 
ables. Not surprisingly, the resulting exchange rate shock vector has a large 
variance, around 10  times that of the IS, LM, and Phillips curve shocks. Given 
its size, we conducted some sensitivity checks on the exchange rate variance. 
Rescaling the variance does not alter the conclusions we draw about the rela- 
tive performance of the rules. 
4.3.2  A Disinflation Experiment 
To assess the plausibility of the system’s properties, we displaced determin- 
istically the intercept of each equation in the model (the IS equation, the money 
demand equation, the aggregate supply equation, and the exchange rate equa- 
tion) by  l percent and traced out in each case the resulting impulse response. 
Each of these impulse responses gave dynamic profiles that were theoretically 
plausible.  For example,  a permanent  negative supply  shock-a  rise  in  the 
NAIRU, say-shifted  inflation and output in opposite directions on impact and 
lowered output below baseline in steady state; whereas a permanent positive 
demand shock-a  rise in overseas demand, say-shifted  output and inflation 
in the same direction initially but was output neutral in steady state. 
To illustrate the calibrated model’s dynamic properties, consider the effects 
of a shock to the reaction function (1). Consider in particular a disinflation- 
a lowering of the inflation target, .rr*-of  1 percentage point. The solid lines 
in figure 4.1 plot the responses of output and inflation to this inflation target 
shock.  Impulse  response  profiles  are  shown as percentage  point  deviations 
from baseline values. 
The economy  has returned  to steady state after around  16 quarters  (four 
years). At that point, inflation is 1 percentage point lower at its new target and 
output is back  to potential.  But the transmission  process in  arriving at this 
endpoint is protracted. Output is below potential for the whole of the period, 
with a maximum marginal effect of around 0.2 percentage points after around 
5 quarters. Output falls partly as a result of a policy-induced rise in real interest 
rates (of around 0.14 percentage points) and partly as a result of the accompa- 
nying real exchange rate appreciation (of around 0.57 percentage points). The 
26. A preferred exchange rate measure would have been the United Kingdom’s trade-weighted 
effective index. But there are no survey data on exchange rate expectations of this index. We also 
looked at the behavior of  the deutsche mark-pound  and yen-pound exchange rates. The variance 
of  the dollar-pound residuals was somewhere between that of mark-pound and yen-pound. Output Response 
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path of output and its maximum response are broadly in line with simulation 
responses from VAR-based studies of the effects of monetary policy shocks in 
the United Kingdom (Dale and Haldane 1995).27  The cumulative loss of  out- 
put-the  sacrifice ratio-is  around 1.5 percent. This sacrifice ratio estimate is 
not greatly out of line with previous U.K. estimates (Bakhshi, Haldane, and 
Hatch 1999) but is if anything on the low side (see below). 
Inflation undergoes an initial downward step owing to the impact effect of 
the exchange rate appreciation on import prices. Although the effect of the 
exchange rate shock is initially to alter the price level, this effect gets embed- 
ded in wage-bargaining  behavior and so has a durable impact on measured 
inflation. Thereafter, inflation follows a gradual downward path toward its new 
target, under the impetus of the negative output gap. The inflation profile and 
in particular the immediate step jump in inflation following the shock are not 
in line with prior reduced-form empirical evidence on the monetary transmis- 
sion mechanism. 
The simulated inflation path is clearly sensitive to the assumptions we have 
made about exchange rate passthrough-namely,  that it is immediate and com- 
plete. In particular, it is the full-passthrough assumption that lies behind the 
initial jump in inflation following a monetary disturbance. So one implication 
of  this assumption is that monetary policy in an open economy can affect con- 
sumer price inflation with almost no lag (Svensson, forthcoming). There may 
well of  course be adverse side effects from an attempt to control inflation in 
this way, such as real exchange rate and hence output destabilization. We illus- 
trate these side effects below. But more fundamentally, the monetary transmis- 
sion lag, and hence the implied degree of inflation control, is clearly acutely 
sensitive to the exchange rate passthrough assumption we have made. 
As a sensitivity check, the dotted lines in figure 4.1 show the responses of 
output and inflation if we assume no direct exchange rate passthrough  into 
consumer prices.28  Monetary policy impulses are then all channeled through 
output, either via the real interest rate or via the real exchange rate. The re- 
sulting output path is little altered. But as we might expect, the downward path 
of inflation is more sluggish, mimicking the output gap. It is in fact now rather 
closer to that found from VAR-based studies of the effects of monetary policy 
in the United Kingdom. Given the clear sensitivity of the inflation profile to 
the passthrough assumption, we use both passthrough models below when con- 
sidering the  effects  of  transmission  lags  on the  optimal degree  of  policy 
forward-lookingness. 
27. Though the shocks are not exactly the same. 
28. Which we reproduce by  assuming the import content of  the consumption basket is zero. 
This would be justified if, e.g., all imported goods were intermediate rather than final goods or, 
more generally, if  the effects of  exchange rate changes were absorbed in foreign exporters’ or 
domestic retailers’ margins rather than in domestic currency consumption prices. See Svensson 
(forthcoming)  for a comparison  of  inflation-targeting rules  based  on consumer  and producer 
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4.3.3 
The impulse responses suggest that our model is a reasonable dynamic rep- 
resentation of  the effects of monetary policy in a small open economy such 
as the United Kingdom, Canada, or New Zealand-the  three longest-serving 
inflation targeters. Nevertheless, the simulated model responses are clearly a 
simplified and stylized characterization of inflation targeting as exercised in 
practice. Two limitations in particular are worth highlighting. 
First, we impose model consistency on all expectations, including the infla- 
tion expectations formed by the central bank that serve as its policy feedback 
variable. This is coherent as a simulation strategy, as otherwise we would have 
to posit some expectational mechanism that was potentially different from the 
model in which the policy rule was being embedded. But the assumption of 
model-consistent expectations has drawbacks too. For example, it underplays 
the role of model uncertainties. These uncertainties are important, but a consid- 
eration of them is beyond the scope of the present paper. Further, the simula- 
tions assume that the inflation target is perfectly credible. So the shock to the 
target shown in figure 4.1  is, in effect, believed fully and immediately. This 
helps explain why the sacrifice ratio implied by figure 4.1 is lower than histori- 
cal estimates; it is the full-credibility case. While the assumption of full credi- 
bility is limiting, it is not obvious that it should affect greatly our inferences 
about the relative performance of various rules, which is the focus of the paper. 
Second, and relatedly, under model-consistent expectations monetary policy 
is assumed to be driven by  the specified policy rule. In particular, the inflation 
forecast of the central bank-the  policy feedback variable-is  conditioned on 
the inflation-targeting policy rule (1). This differs somewhat from actual cen- 
tral bank practice in some countries. For example, in the United Kingdom the 
Bank of England's published inflation forecasts are usually conditioned on an 
assumption of unchanged interest rates.29  This means that there is not a direct 
read-across from our forecast-based rules to inflation targeting in practice in 
some countries. 
Even among those countries that use it, however, the constant interest rate 
assumption is seen largely as a short-term expedient. It is not appropriate, for 
example, when simulating a forward-looking model-as  here-because  it de- 
prives the system of a nominal anchor and thus leaves the price level indetermi- 
nate. So in our simulations we instead condition monetary policy (actual and 
in expectation) on the reaction function (1). This delivers a determinate price 
level. Simulations conducted in this way  come close to mimicking current 
monetary policy  practice in  New  Zealand (Reserve Bank of  New  Zealand 
1997). There, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand's policy projections are based 
on an explicit policy reaction function, which is very similar to the baseline 
Some Limitations of the Simulations 
29. This is also often the case with forecasts produced for the Federal Reserve Boards "Green 
Book" (see Reifschneider, Stockton, and Wilcox 1996). 173  Forward-Looking Rules for Monetary Policy 
rule (1). The Bank of England also recently began publishing inflation projec- 
tions based on market expectations of future interest rates, rather than constant 
interest rates. This means that differences between the forecast-based rule (I) 
and inflation targeting in practice may not be so sharp. 
4.4  Stochastic Policy Analysis 
We now turn to consider the performance of the baseline rule (I) and com- 
pare it with alternative rules. This is done by embedding the various rules in the 
model outlined above and evaluating the resulting (unconditional) moments of 
output, inflation, and the policy instrument-the  arguments typically thought 
to enter the central bank's  loss function. Specifically, following Taylor (1993), 
we consider where each of the rules places the economy on the output-inflation 
variability frontier. 
4.4.1  Lag Encompassing: The Optimal Degree 
of Policy Forward-Lookingness 
The most obvious rationale for a forward-looking monetary policy rule is 
that it can embody explicitly the lags in monetary transmission. But how for- 
ward looking? Is there some optimal forecasting horizon from which to feed 
back? And, if so, what does this optimal targeting horizon depend on? 
Answers to these questions are clearly sensitive to the assumed length of the 
lag itself. So we experiment below with both our earlier models: one assuming 
full and immediate import price passthrough (a shorter transmission lag), and 
the other no immediate passthrough  (a longer transmission lag). Figure 4.2 
plots the locus of output-inflation variability  points delivered by the rule (1) 
as the horizon of the inflation forecast (j)  is varied. Two lines are plotted  in 
figure 4.2, representing the two passthrough cases. Along these loci, we vary j 
between  zero  (current-period  inflation  targeting)  and  16  (four-year-ahead 
inflation-forecast targeting)  Our baseline rule (j  = 8) lies between 
these extremes. The two remaining policy choice parameters in rule (l),  {y,  e}, 
are for the moment set at their baseline values of 0.5.31  Points to the south and 
west in figure 4.2 are clearly welfare superior, and points  to the north  and 
east inferior. 
Several points are clear from figure 4.2. First, irrespective of  the assumed 
degree of passthrough, the optimal forecast horizon is always positive and lies 
somewhere  between three and six quarters ahead. This forecast horizon  se- 
cures as good inflation performance as any other, while at the same time deliv- 
ering lowest output variability. The latter result arises because three to six quar- 
ters is around the horizon at which monetary policy has its largest marginal 
30. Some of  the longer horizon feedback rules were unstable, which we discuss further be- 
low. In fig. 4.2 we  show the maximum permissible  feedback horizon:  14 periods for the full- 
passthrough case and 12 periods for the no-passthrough case. 
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impact. The (integrals of) real interest and exchange rate changes necessary to 
hit the inflation target are minimized at this horizon. So too, therefore, is the 
degree of output destabilization (the integral of output losses). At shorter hori- 
zons than this, the adjustment in monetary policy necessary to return inflation 
to target is that much greater-the  upshot of which is a destabilization of out- 
put. Once we allow for the fact that central banks in practice feed back from 
annual inflation rates, whereas our model-based feedback variable is a quar- 
terly inflation rate, the optimal forecast horizon implied by our simulations (of 
three to six quarters) is rather similar to that used by inflation-targeting central 
banks in practice (of six to eight quarters).32 
Second, taking either passthrough assumption, feeding back from a forecast 
horizon much beyond six quarters leads to worse outcomes for both inflation 
and output variability. This is the flip side of the arguments used above. Just as 
short-horizon targeting implies “too much” of a policy response to counteract 
shocks, long-horizon targeting can equally imply that policy does “too little,” 
thereby setting in train a destabilizing expectational feedback. This works as 
follows. 
Beyond a certain forecast horizon, the effects of  any inflation shock have 
32. This comparison is also not exact because the two definitions of horizon are different: the 
feedback horizon in the rule and the policy horizon in practice (the point at which expected infla- 
tion is in line with the inflation target) are distinct concepts. 175  Forward-Looking Rules for Monetary Policy 
been damped out of the system by  the actions of  the central bank: expected 
inflation is back to target. This implies that, beyond that horizon, our forward- 
looking monetary policy rule says “do nothing”;  it is entirely hands-off.  In 
expectation, policy has already done its job. But an entirely “hands-off‘’ policy 
will be destabilizing for inflation expectations-and  hence for inflation to- 
day-if  it is the policy path actually followed in practice. This is because of the 
circular relationship  between  forward-looking policy behavior and forward- 
looking inflation expectations. The one generates oscillations  in  the other, 
which in turn give rise to further feedback on the first. Beyond a certain thresh- 
old horizon-when  policy is very forward looking-this  circularity leads to 
explosiveness. So this is one general instance in which forward-looking rules 
generate instabilities: namely, when the forecast horizon extends well beyond 
the transmission lag.33  The possibility of instabilities and indeterminacies aris- 
ing in forecast-based rules is discussed in Woodford (1994) and Bernanke and 
Woodford (1997). The mechanism here is very similar. 
Third, the main differences between the two passthrough loci show up at 
horizons less than four quarters. Over these horizons, the full-passthrough lo- 
cus heads due south, while the no-passthrough locus heads southwest. With 
incomplete passthrough,  policy  forward-lookingness  reduces  both  inflation 
and output variability. This is because inflation transmission lags are lengthier 
in this particular case. Embodying these (lengthier) lags explicitly in the policy 
reaction function thus improves inflation control; it guards against monetary 
policy acting too late. Preemptive policy helps stabilize inflation in the face of 
transmission lags. At the same time it also helps smooth output, for the reasons 
outlined above. 
The same is generally true in the full-passthrough case, except that most of 
the benefits then accrue to output stabilization. The gains in inflation stabili- 
zation from looking forward are small because inflation control can now be 
secured relatively quickly through the exchange rate effect on consumption 
prices. But  the  gains  in  output  stabilization  are  still  considerable because 
shorter forecast-horizon targeting induces larger real interest rate and in partic- 
ular real exchange rate gyrations, with attendant output costs. 
All  in  all,  figure  4.2  illustrates  fairly  persuasively  the case  for policy 
forward-lookingness. Using a forecast horizon of three to six quarters delivers 
far superior outcomes for output and inflation stabilization than, say, current- 
period  inflation  targeting.  Largely, this  is  the  result  of  transmission  lags. 
Forecast-based rules are, in this sense, lag encompassing. This also provides 
some  empirical justification  for  the  operational  practice  among  inflation- 
targeting  central banks of feeding back from inflation forecasts at horizons 
beyond one year. 
Plainly, the optimal degree of policy forward-lookingness is sensitive to the 
model (and in particular the lag) specification. In the baseline model, this lag 
33. We highlight some other cases below 176  Nicoletta Batini and Andrew G. Haldane 
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structure hinges on the assumed degree of  stickiness in wage setting. This 
stickiness in turn depends on the nature of wage-price contracting and on the 
degree of forward-lookingness in wage bargaining. Given this, one way to in- 
terpret the need for forward-lookingness in policy is that it is serving to com- 
pensate for the backward-lookingness  in wage bargaining-whether  directly 
through  wage-bargaining  behavior  or indirectly  due to  the  effect  of  con- 
tracting. In a sense, forward-looking monetary policy is acting, in a second- 
best fashion, to counter a backward-looking externality elsewhere in the econ- 
omy. It is interesting to explore this notion further by considering the trade-off 
between the degree of backward-lookingness on the part of the private sector 
in the course of their wage bargaining and the degree of forward-lookingness 
on the part of the central bank in the course of its interest rate setting.34 
Figure 4.3 illustrates this trade-off.  Point A in figure 4.3 plots the most 
backward-looking  aggregate (wage setting plus policy setting) outcome. The 
central bank feeds back from current inflation when setting policy (j  = 0) and 
wage bargainers assign a weight of only 0.1 to next period's inflation rate when 
entering the wage bargain  (xo  = 0.1). This results in a very poor macroeco- 
nomic outcome, in particular for output variability. In hitting its inflation target, 
the central bank acts myopically. And the myopia of private sector agents then 
34. Equivalently, we could have looked at the effects of altering the length of wage contracting. 177  Forward-Looking Rules for Monetary Policy 
aggravates  the effects of  bad policy  on the real  economy  through  inflation 
stickiness. 
The solid  line  emanating from point  A  traces  out the  locus  of  output- 
inflation variabilities as xo  rises from 0.1 to 0.9, so that wage bargaining be- 
comes progressively  more forward looking. Policy, for now, remains myopic 
(  j  = 0). In general, the upshot is a welfare improvement. With wages becom- 
ing a jump(ier) variable,  even myopic policy can bootstrap inflation back to 
target following shocks. Moreover, wage flexibility means that these inflation 
adjustments can be brought about at lower output cost. So both inflation and 
output variability are damped. Fully flexible wages take us closer to a first best. 
There is little need for policy to then have a forward-looking dimension. 
The same is not  true,  of  course,  when  wages embody a high  degree  of 
backward-lookingness. The dashed line in figure 4.3 plots aj-locus with xo = 
0.1. Though the resulting equilibria are clearly second best in comparison with 
the forward-looking private sector equilibria, forward-looking monetary policy 
does now  secure a significant improvement over the bad backward-looking 
equilibrium at point A. In this instance, policy forward-lookingness is serving 
as a surrogate for forward-looking behavior on the part of the private sector. 
Finally, the two vertical lines in figure 4.3, drawn atj  = 6 and xo = 0.3, 
indicate  degrees of  economy-wide forward-lookingness  beyond  which  the 
economy is unstable. For example, neither of the combinations {j  = 6, xo = 
0.4) and (j  = 7, xo = 0.3) yields stable macroeconomic outcomes. This sug- 
gests that, just as a very backward-looking  behavioral  combination  yields a 
bad equilibrium (point A), so too does a very forward-looking combination. It 
also serves notice of the potential instability problems of forecast-based rules. 
In general, policy forward-lookingness is only desirable as a second-best coun- 
terweight to the lags in monetary transmission. The first best is for the lags 
themselves  to  shrink-for  example,  because  private  sector  agents become 
more forward looking. When this is the case, there is positive merit in the cen- 
tral bank itself not being too forward looking because that risks engendering 
instabilities. 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the above points rather differently. It generalizes the 
baseline model to accommodate forward-lookingness in the IS curve, follow- 
ing McCallum and Nelson (forthcoming). Specifically, we set (somewhat arbi- 
trarily) a,  = a,  = 0.5, so that the backward- and forward-looking output terms 
in the IS curve are equally weighted.35 The solid line in figure 4.4 plots the 
j-locus in  this modified  model,  with  the dashed  line showing the same for 
the baseline model. 
The modified model j-locus generally lies in a welfare-superior location to 
that under the baseline model, at least at short targeting horizons. For small j, 
35. McCallum and Nelson’s (forthcoming) baseline model has {a,  = 0, a2  = l}. That formula- 
tion is unstable in our model. 178  Nicoletta Batini and Andrew G. Haldane 
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Fig. 4.4  j-Loci: baseline and modified models 
both inflation and output variability are lower in the modified model. Increas- 
ing private sector forward-lookingness takes us nearer the first best. Policy 
forward-lookingness clearly still confers some benefits,  since the modified 
model j-locus moves initially to the southwest. But these benefits cease much 
beyond j = 3; and beyond j = 6 the system is explosive. So, again, policy 
forward-lookingness is only desirable when used as a counterweight to the lags 
in monetary transmission, here reflected in the backward-looking behavior of 
the private sector; it is not, of itself, desirable. The less of this intrinsic slug- 
gishness  in  the  economy,  the  less  the  need  for  compensating  forward- 
lookingness through monetary policy. 
4.4.2  Output Encompassing: Output Stabilization 
through Inflation Targeting 
Although the policy rule (1) contains no explicit output terms, it is already 
clear that inflation-forecast-based rules are far from output invariant. Figure 
4.2 suggests that lengthening the targeting horizon up to and beyond one year 
ahead can secure clear and significant improvements in output stabilization. 
Judicious choice of the forecast horizon should allow the authorities, operating 
according to rule (I), to select their preferred degree of output stabilization. 
That is not to say, however, that the output stabilization embodied in policy 
rules such as rule (1) cannot be improved upon. For example, might not output 
stabilization be further improved by adding explicit output gap terms to equa- 
tion (I)? Figure 4.5 shows the effect of this addition. The dashed line simply 
redraws the full-passthrough j-locus from figure 4.2. The ray  emerging from 179  Forward-Looking Rules for Monetary Policy 
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this line, starting from the base-case horizon (j  = 8) and moving initially to 
the south, plots outcomes from a rule that adds output gap terms to rule (1) 
with successively higher  These weights,  denoted X,  run from 0.1 
to 8.?’ 
Two main points are evident from figure 4.5. First, adding explicit output 
terms to a forward-looking policy rule does appear to improve output stabiliza- 
tion, with no costs in terms of inflation control-provided  the weights attached 
to output are sufficiently  small. The ray  moves due south for 0 < A  < 1. 
Second, when A > 1 some output-inflation  variability trade-off does start to 
emerge, with improvements in output stabilization coming at the cost of greater 
inflation variability.  Indeed, for X > 2 we begin to move in a northeasterly 
direction, with both output and inflation variability worsening. At X = 10, the 
system is explosive. In general, though, figure 4.5 seems to indicate that the 
addition of output gap terms to a forward-looking rule does yield clear welfare 
improvements for small enough A. Put somewhat differently, it appears to sug- 
gest that an inflation-forecast-based  rule cannot synthetically recreate the de- 
gree of output stabilization possible by targeting the output gap explicitly. 
However, this conclusion ignores the fact that the feedback coefficient on 
expected inflation, 8, can also be altered and that this parameter itself influ- 
ences output stabilization. Figure 4.6 plots a set of j-loci varying the value of 
36. The corresponding ray in the no-passthrough case is very similar. So we stick here with the 
37. Weights much above 8 were found to generate instability; see below. 
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8 between 0.1 and 5.'8  Increasing 8 tends to take us in a southwesterly direc- 
tion; that is, it lowers both output and inflation ~ariability.~~  Aggressive feed- 
back responses are welfare improving and, in particular, are output stabilizing. 
This reason is that agents factor this aggressiveness in policy response into 
their expectations when setting wages. Inflation expectations are thus less dis- 
turbed  following  inflation  shocks.  Inflation  control,  via  this  expectational 
mechanism, is thereby improved. And with inflation expectations damped fol- 
lowing shocks, there is then less need for an offsetting response from monetary 
policy. As a consequence, output variability is also reduced by the greater ag- 
gressiveness in policy responses.40 
The gains in inflation stabilization are initially pronounced as 8 rises above 
its 0.5 baseline value. These inflation gains cease-indeed,  go into reverse- 
beyond 8 = 1. Thereafter, most of the gains from increasing 8 show up in im- 
proved output stabilization, usually at the expense of some destabilization of 
inflation. The inflation-forecast-based rule delivering lowest output variability 
is {j  = 5,  8 = 5).  This gives a standard deviation of output uy  = 0.71 percent 
and of inflation uT = 1.32 percent.41  So can this rule be improved upon by the 
addition of explicit output terms? 
The answer, roughly  speaking, is no. Adding an explicit output weight to 
the rule {j  = 5,  8 = 5)  yields unstable outcomes. The trajectories that result 
from adding output terms to otherj-loci with smaller 0 are shown in figure 4.7. 
The gain in output stabilization from adding explicit output terms seems to be 
very marginal. Moreover, it comes at the expense of a significant destabiliza- 
tion  of  inflation.  For example,  the parameter  triplet {j,  8, X)  delivering the 
lowest  output variability  is (j  = 5, 8  = 4, X  = 1). This yields uy = 0.69 
percent and u,, = I .37 percent-an  output gain of only 0.02 percentage points 
and an inflation loss of 0.05 percentage points in comparison with the rule that 
gives no weight to output whatsoever, {j  = 5,  8 = 5,  A = O].42  It is clear that 
the optimal X is now smaller even than in the earlier (0 = 0.5) case. Any X > 1 
now takes us into unambiguously welfare-inferior territory. In forward-looking 
rules there would seem to be benefits from placing a higher relative weight on 
expected inflation than on output. Indeed, to a first approximation, a weight of 
zero on output (A = 0) comes close to being optimal. 
Figure 4.7 suggests that there is, in effect, an output variability threshold at 
around uy  = 0.70 percent. None of the rules, with or without output gap terms, 
38. At values of 8 > 5, the system was again explosive. 
39. This is less clear for high values of  8 (8 > 1). The benefits then tend to be greater for output 
than for inflation stabilization. Increasing 8 also increases instrument variability, from 0.27 to 1.35 
percent as 8 moves from 0.1 to 5. 
40. Higher values of 8 are not always welfare enhancing. Larger values of  H also increase the 
diversity of macroeconomic outcomes at extreme values ofj. For example, current-period inflation 
targeting (j  = 0) leads to a very high output variance when 8 is large. And whenj is large, high 
values of 8 increase the chances of explosive outcomes. For example, when 8 = 5 simulations are 
explosive beyond a five-quarter forecasting horizon. 
41. Output variability is then considerably lower than in the {j  = 8, 8 = 0.5}  base case (a,,  = 
0.93 percent). 
42. It also raises instrument variability from 1.8 to  I .92 percent. 182  Nicoletta Batini and Andrew G. Haldane 
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Fig. 4.7  Output variability threshold 
can squeeze output variability much beyond that threshold. By  appropriate 
choice of  {j,  O}, inflation-forecast-based rules appear capable of  taking us to 
that threshold, give or take a very small number. Almost any amount of output 
smoothing can be synthetically recreated with an inflation-only rule. Forecast- 
based rules are, in this sense, output encompassing. Inflation nutters and output 
junkies may disagree over the parameters in rule (1)-that  is a question of 
policy tastes. But they need not differ over the arguments entering this rule- 
that is a question of policy technology. 
4.4.3  Information Encompassing: A Comparison with Alternative Rules 
Another of the supposed merits of an inflation-forecast-based rule is that it 
embodies-and  thus implicitly feeds back from-all  information that is rele- 
vant for predicting the future dynamics of  inflation. For this reason, it may 
approximate the optimal state-contingent rule. Certainly, by  this reasoning, 
forward-looking rules should deliver outcomes at least as good as rules that 
feed back from a restrictive subset of information variables, such as output and 
inflation under the Taylor rule. These are empirically testable propositions. 
To assess how close our forecast-based rule takes us to macroeconomic nir- 
vana, we solve for the time-inconsistent optimal state-contingent rule in our 
system. This is the rule that solves the control problem 183  Forward-Looking Rules for Monetary Policy 
Table 4.1  Comparing Optimal (OPT) and Inflation Forecast-Based (IFB{  j,  O}) 
Rules (standard deviation u  in percent) 
Rule  UY  u,,  cr  Y 
OPT  0.782  1.103  1.033  41.83 
IFB( j = 0, O = OS}  1.52  1.199  0.925  76.37 
IFB(j = 3, O = 0.51  1.07  1.17  0.61  52.61 
IFB(j  = 6,0 = 0.5)  0.91  1.34  0.5  1  54.18 
IFB( j = 9, O  = 0.5)  0.94  1.57  0.40  68.04 
IFB(j  = 0, O  = 5.0)  8.86  1.49  10.33  755.8 
IFB[j = 5,0  = 5.0}  0.716  1.32  1.34  53.91 
Note: The value of the smoothing parameter is y = 0.5. 
where o  denotes the relative weight assigned to inflation deviations from target 
vis-8-vis output deviations from trend and 6 is the weight assigned to instru- 
ment variability. 
Because there are three arguments in the loss function, the easiest way  to 
summarize the performance of the various rules relative to the optimal rule is 
by  evaluating stochastic welfare losses (z),  having set common values for 
the preference parameters { p, w, 5).  We  (somewhat arbitrarily) set p = 0.998, 
o  = 0.5, and 6 = 0.1. So inflation and output variability are equally weighted, 
and both are given higher weight than instrument variability. Table 4.1 then 
compares welfare losses from the optimal rule (OPT) with those from two 
specifications of  the inflation-forecast-based (IFB) rule (0 = 0.5 and 0 = 5) 
for various values of j!3  Table 4.1 also shows the standard deviations of output, 
inflation, and (real) interest rates that result from each of these policy rule spec- 
ifications. 
Current-period inflation targeting (  j = 0) clearly does badly by comparison 
with the optimal rule. For example, the rule {j  = 0, 0 = 0.5) delivers welfare 
losses that are 85 percent larger than  the first best. Inflation-forecust-based 
rules clearly take us much closer-if  not all the way-to  that welfare opti- 
mum.@  For example, {j  = 6, 6 = 0.5) delivers a welfare loss only 30 percent 
worse  than  the  optimum. The  optimal values  of  {j,  0) cannot be  derived 
uniquely from table 4.1, since they clearly depend on the (arbitrary) values we 
have  assigned to the preference parameters {w,  E) in the objective function. 
But for our chosen preference parameters, the best forecast horizon appears to 
lie between three and six periods, irrespective of the value of 0. 
We  can also compare these forward-looking rules with a variety of simple, 
backward-looking Taylor-type formulations, which feed back from contempo- 
43. Where the optimal rule, the associated moments of output, inflation, and the interest rate, 
and the value of the stochastic welfare loss are calculated using the OPT routine of the ACES/ 
PRISM solution package. See n. 23. 
44. As we  discuss below,  altering the smoothing parameter, y, takes us nearer still to the first 
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Table 4.2  Comparison of Optimal (OPT), Inflation Forecast-Based (IFB{ j,  O}), 
and Taylor (Tl/T2{a, b,  c}) Rules (standard deviation u  in percent) 
OFT 
IFB{j  = 6,O = 0.5) 
IFB{j = 5,O = 5.0) 
Tl{a = 2, b = 0.8, c = 1) 
Tl(a=0.2,b=  1,c= 1) 
T1{  a = 0.5, b = 0.5, c = 0) 
Tl{a = 0.5, b = 1, c = 0) 
Tl{a=0.2,b=0.06,~=  1.3) 
T2{a  = 2, b = 0.8, c = 1) 
T2{a = 0.2, b = 1,  c = 1) 
T2{a = 0.5, b = 0.5, c = 0) 
T2(a  = 0.5, b = 1, c = 0) 
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Note: The value of the smoothing parameter is y = 0.5. 
raneous or lagged values of output and inflation. In particular, for comparabil- 
ity with the other studies in this volume, we consider two types of rule: 
(1 1)  I;  =  ant +  b(Y, - Y?) +  crt-,> 
for a variety of values of {a,  b, c}  listed  We classify the first Tl{a, b, 
c} rule and the second T2{a, b, c>  rules. The rule Tl{a = 0.5, b = 0.5, c = 
0} is of course the well-known Taylor rule. A comparison of these rules with 
the OPT and IFB rules is given in table 4.2. 
We  draw several general conclusions from table 4.2. First, looking just at 
the performance of  the backward-looking rules, it appears that placing a higher 
weight on output than on inflation yields welfare improvements. This is differ- 
ent than was found to be the case with forward-looking rules. Second, because 
they are based on an inferior (time t - 1) information set, the T2 rules do 
worse than the T1 rules. The difference in welfare losses is not, however, that 
great. This suggests that, at least over the course of  one quarter, information 
lags do not impose that much of a welfare cost. Third, both of the rules placing 
a small weight on output (b <  0.1) and a large weight on smoothing (c > 1) 
yield unstable outcomes in our model. Higher weights on output (b  > 0.5) or 
lower weights on smoothing (c < 1) are necessary to deliver a stable equilib- 
rium. Fourth, even the best performing backward-looking rule-interestingly, 
45. One difference from the other exercises is that here the policy instrument is the short-tern 
real (rather than nominal) interest rate. This should not affect the relative performance of the rules. 
But we have subtracted one from the inflation parameter, a,  when simulating the backward-looking 
policy rules to ensure comparability with the other studies. 185  Forward-Looking Rules for Monetary Policy 
the Taylor rule-delivers  a welfare outcome almost 50 percent worse than the 
optimum. By comparison, the best forward-looking rule delivers a welfare loss 
that is around 30 percent worse than the optimum. 
The final conclusion is evidence of the information-encompassing nature of 
inflation-forecast-based rules. A forward-looking rule conditions on all vari- 
ables that affect future inflation and output dynamics, not just output and infla- 
tion themselves. In the context of our simple open economy model, an impor- 
tant set of additional state variables are (lagged values of) the exchange rate, 
as well as additional lags of wages and prices. Just as the optimal feedback 
rule conditions on these  state variables, so too will inflation-forecast-based 
rules. That is not a feature shared by Taylor rules. In larger models than the one 
presented here, these extra conditioning variables would include those other 
information variables affecting future inflation dynamics, such as (lagged) as- 
set and commodity prices. These variables will be captured in forward-looking 
rules, but not in Taylor-type specifications. In general, the larger the model, 
the more diffuse will be the information sets of Taylor-type and forward-look- 
ing rules.46  The welfare differences between forward- and backward-looking 
rules are thus also likely to be larger in these bigger models. So while inflation- 
forecast-based rules cannot take us all the way to the first best, in general they 
seem likely to take us further in that direction than Taylor-type specifications, 
at the same time as they retain the simplicity and transparency of the Taylor- 
type rules. 
4.4.4  Other Policy Parameters 
Finally, we explore two further design features of inflation-forecast-based 
rules. First, what is the preferred degree of interest rate smoothing, y, in such 
a rule? And second, how does a regime of price level targeting compare with 
the inflation-targeting specifications considered so far? 
On interest rate smoothing, the solid line in figure 4.8 replots the j-locus 
from the baseline rule. The rays (dotted lines) emanating from this at j  = (3, 
6, 91 periods illustrate how output-inflation variabilities are affected as y varies 
between zero (no smoothing) and one. These rays are almost horizontal. Instru- 
ment smoothing delivers greater inflation stability, with relatively few counter- 
vailing output costs. For example, inflation variability is lowered by 33 percent 
when moving from y = 0 to y = 1, for {j  = 6, 8 = 0.5). This arises because 
rules with higher degrees of  smoothing deliver more persistent interest rate 
responses. These policy responses in turn have a larger impact effect on the 
exchange rate-and  hence on inflation itself.47  This sharper inflation control 
comes at some output cost, though our simulations suggest that this cost is 
fairly small. The benefits of instrument smoothing are smaller (and potentially 
46. This is, e.g., what Black et al. (1997) find when simulating the larger scale Bank of Canada 
47. This is even true-though  to a lesser extent-in  the no-passthrough case. 
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Fig. 4.8  j-Locus and y-locus 
trivial) at higher values of 0, however, because policy aggressiveness does the 
same job as instrument persistence in improving inflation control. 
If  we evaluate welfare losses using the earlier parameterization of  the loss 
function, then the no-smoothing rule {y = 0,j = 6,0 = 0.5) delivers a welfare 
loss that is 14 percent higher than that from the high-smoothing rule (y  = 1, 
j  = 6, 0 = 0.5). Indeed, the latter rule now takes us within 25 percent of the 
optimal rule. So it seems in general that relatively high degrees of interest rate 
smoothing are welfare enhancing, but that the extent of this welfare improve- 
ment may be small if policy is already aggressive. 
On price level targeting, our baseline rule now takes the modified form: 
(13)  c  =  yc~  + (1 - r1rT-t  ~(E,P;+,  - P'"). 
Monetary policy now shoots for a deterministic price level path, pc*,  which we 
again normalize to zero (in logs). Using the baseline model and the parameter 
settings {  y = 0, 0 = 0.5},"8  figure 4.9 plots the j-locus that results from the 
price  level rule  (13). The baseline inflation-forecast-based rule  (1) is also 
shown for comparison (dashed line). For most values of j,  the price level- 
targeting rule delivers welfare-inferior outcomes to the inflation-targeting rule: 
both  output and inflation variability are higher. This is particularly true of 
short-horizon (e.g., current period) price level targeting. Other studies have 
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Fig. 4.9  Inflation and price level targeting 
also found this to be the case (Duguay 1994; Fillion and Tetlow 1993; Lebow, 
Roberts, and Stockton  1992; Haldane and Salmon  1995). Nevertheless,  for 
large enough j,  price-level-targeting  rules still perform little worse  (and in 
some cases perhaps better) than inflation-targeting rules. 
Moreover, this comparison may unfairly disadvantage price level targeting. 
The baseline model still embodies a relatively high degree of inflution persis- 
tence. It is questionable whether such persistence would survive the move to a 
monetary regime that delivered price level stationarity. In that situation, price 
level persistence might be a more realistic specification of price dynamics. In 
the context of our model, wage contracting might then be better characterized 
by a conventional Taylor staggered contract wage specification, rather than the 
Fuhrer-Moore formulation we have used so far.49  That is, the contracting equa- 
tion (6) would be replaced by 
(14)  y  =  xoE,w,+1 + (1 -  xolw,.., +  X,(Y, - Y3  +  E,, 
and the Phillips curve equivalent of equation (8) would now be 
where p = (1 -  +)/+. Inflation no longer depends on lagged values; it is a 
jump variable. 
49. Though, in principle, the relative wage formulation of Fuhrer and Moore (1995a) is meant 
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The solid line in figure 4.10 plots the j-locus for the price level policy rule 
(13), with equation (15) now replacing equation (8) in the model. This locus 
clearly lies to the south of the j-locus under inflation targeting using the base- 
line model (dashed line). Price level targeting now does as good (or better) a 
job of stabilizing output as inflation targeting. This is the result of the increased 
flexibility in prices. Inflation variability remains higher than under some speci- 
fications of inflation targeting, but never excessively so. In sum, even the shorf- 
term output-inflation variability  costs of  price level targeting appear to be 
much less pernicious than may have typically been thought likely, under certain 
parameterizations of the underlying model and policy rule and assuming per- 
fect credibility of such a regime.5o  For a comprehensive welfare theoretic com- 
parison, the longer term benefits of  a price level standard would need to be set 
against these (potential) short-term costs. 
4.5  Conclusions 
It is widely recognized that monetary policy needs a forward-looking di- 
mension. Inflation-targeting countries have explicitly embodied that notion in 
the design of  their forecast-based policy rules. In principle, these rules con- 
fer some real benefits: they embody explicitly transmission lags (lag encom- 
50. Williams (1997) and Black et al. (1997) reach similar conclusions in their studies of  the 
United States and Canada, respectively. In a theoretical context, Svensson (1996)  also argues that 
price level targeting need not raise output-inflation variabilities. 189  Forward-Looking Rules for Monetary Policy 
passing);  they potentially embody all information useful for predicting future 
inflation (information encompassing);  and, suitably designed, they can achieve 
a degree of output smoothing (output encompassing). This paper has evaluated 
quantitatively these features of  an inflation-forecast-based rule using simula- 
tion techniques. Our main conclusions follow: 
I. On lag encompassing, an  inflation forecast horizon of three to six quarters 
appears  to  deliver the  best  performance,  in  the  context  of  our  inflation- 
forecast-based policy rules. Shorter horizons than this risk raising both output 
and inflation variability-the  result of  policy lags-while  longer horizons 
risk macroeconomic instability. In general, the greater the degree of fonvard- 
lookingness on the part of  the private sector, the less the compensating need 
for forward-lookingness by  the central bank. These results support the fore- 
cast-based approach to monetary policy making pursued by inflation-targeting 
central banks in practice. 
2. An  inflation-forecast-based rule, with an appropriately chosen targeting 
horizon, naturally embodies a degree of  output stabilization. Moreover, any 
degree of output smoothing can be synthetically recreated by judicious choice 
of  the parameters entering an inflation-forecast-based rule. There is no need 
for any explicit output terms to enter this rule. That is evidence of the output- 
encompassing nature of inflation targeting based around inflation forecasts. 
3. While not taking us all the way to the welfare optimum, forecast-based 
rules do seem capable of  securing welfare-superior outcomes to backward- 
looking specifications, the type of which have been the mainstay in the liter- 
ature to date. That is evidence of  the information-encompassing nature of 
forecast-based policy rules. 
We have also evaluated forecast-based price level rules for monetary policy. 
Under certain parameterizations, they perform creditably even as a short-run 
macroestabilizer. Perhaps, so soon after having secured low inflation, there is 
understandable caution about pursuing something as new as a price level stan- 
dard. Perhaps. Inflation targeting is indeed an embryonic monetary framework, 
whose performance has yet  to be properly tested. But price level targeting, 
indubitably, is not. 
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Comment  Donald L. KO~ 
I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the paper by  Batini and Haldane. I have 
a few comments on the paper, and I also want to take this opportunity to talk 
a bit about the use-or  nonuse-of  policy rules by policymakers at the Federal 
Reserve. In both cases, my intent is to raise questions that Batini and Haldane, 
and other authors working in this area, might consider addressing to better 
meet the needs of those policymakers. 
With regard to the paper, my  questions relate to three conclusions of  the 
paper for policymakers-one  implicit and the other two explicit: First, central 
banks should consider the exchange rate channel for policy: open economy 
effects are important. Second, central banks should be forward looking, but 
not too forward looking. Third, central banks do not need to include output 
smoothing explicitly in their reaction functions. 
On the first point, I found the open economy aspect of  the model useful 
and appropriate. I thought the authors structured the transmission sensibly- 
probably because we tend to view it quite similarly in analysis at the Federal 
Reserve. The exchange rate has two channels through which to affect infla- 
tion-indirectly  through net exports and the output gap, and directly through 
effects on prices-and  their interactions influence the dynamics of  the re- 
sponse of inflation to monetary policy or to an exchange rate shock. The de- 
mand channel will have potentially lasting effects on the inflation rate, while 
the supply-side price level effect has a mostly temporary impact. Monetary 
policymakers need to be aware of  these differences as they assess incoming 
data and form new forecasts after an exchange rate change. Moreover, the pol- 
icy instrument in the model appropriately remains the short-term interest rate, 
which responds to changes in the exchange rate indirectly through their effect 
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on the inflation forecast, not in an automatic, predetermined way,  as would 
result if  the central bank targeted a monetary conditions index (MCI). The 
policy response to variations in the exchange rate ought to depend on the rea- 
sons for those variations and their consequences. And the MCI arbitrarily ele- 
vates exchange rates relative to many other important aspects of financial con- 
ditions-for  example, credit conditions, bond rates, or equity prices-in  the 
policy process. 
Even though the United States is not as open as the United Kingdom, ex- 
change rates have proved to be an important channel of policy influence and a 
source of  shocks-in  some cases persisting for some time, as in the 1980s. 
Exchange rates and the foreign sector play a substantial role in the large-scale 
models we have at the Federal Reserve Board, but they do not always get the 
attention they deserve in smaller scale models sometimes used to examine pol- 
icy strategies. 
In this light, I would have benefited from a fuller treatment of the exchange 
rate channel. The authors begin with some sensitivity analysis of  alternative 
specifications of this channel but do not follow through in the rest of  the paper. 
In addition, as the authors note, the exchange rate shocks are not derived by 
using a model of exchange rate movements as a baseline, but rather by compar- 
ing actual rates to the forecasts of market participants responding to a survey, 
and the misses are an order of magnitude larger than the other shocks. I won- 
dered whether the market forecasts from which these shocks were drawn were 
consistent with the underlying model of  covered interest arbitrage. Spot ex- 
change rate movements themselves have deviated from the implications of this 
arbitrage condition over extended periods, presenting challenges to forward- 
looking central banks. It would be interesting to know how sensitive the paper's 
conclusions-for  example, about the appropriate forecast horizon for policy- 
making or the losses from omitting explicit output targets-were  to the size 
and nature of  the exchange rate shocks. Among other things, it might help 
those of us in not quite so open economies judge the generality of the results. 
The analysis that produced the second conclusion-that  central banks need 
to be  forward looking, but not too much-also  was informative and raised 
questions. When a shock hits the system, something else must change to damp 
the resulting fluctuations in output and prices. It can be the private sector di- 
rectly altering its spending and price and wage setting, or it can be the cen- 
tral bank adjusting to its interest rate target, which in turn induces stabilizing 
private sector behavior. The authors usefully discuss trade-offs in terms of 
forward-looking behavior to stabilize economies. If  the private sector looks 
ahead, the central bank need not be so forward looking, presumably because 
private parties anticipating the central bank's  eventual response will make deci- 
sions that have the effect of offsetting the shock. All the private sector needs 
to know is how the central bank will react, and it can adapt to a wide range of 
strengths of reactions, without seriously affecting the volatility of output and 
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up for that by  persisting in their policy moves. That persistence will get built 
into asset markets-in  this model, the exchange rate-to  influence private 
spending. Central banks need to look well into the future primarily when pri- 
vate spenders are not loolung ahead but instead are responding gradually to 
incoming information. Adaptive expectations tend to produce long lags in the 
effects of  policy changes, and under these circumstances, anticipatory policy 
can pay important dividends in stabilizing the economy and the inflation rate. 
One aspect of the model results was the relatively narrow time frame for 
forward-looking behavior  that  produced favorable results. This  knife-edge 
quality raised questions about the characteristics of the model. Obviously, if 
both the private sector and central bank are mostly backward looking, it will 
take a while to damp the effects of shocks, which have to get built into actual 
prices and output to elicit responses. But in this model, the deterioration in 
performance for backward-looking policies seemed especially marked  and 
stood in contrast to other results at this conference. Moreover, the central bank 
and the private sector can be too forward looking as well in the model. In 
effect, stabilizing actions do not occur because all actors are looking beyond 
the shock to the return of  stability. I suspect that excessively forward-looking 
private and public sectors have not been a cause of economic problems over 
the years. Perhaps private agents really do rely mostly on recent information 
to form expectations. And certainly central banks would modify reaction func- 
tions if they sensed destabilizing behavior. It would be interesting to see how 
sensitive the model’s results in this regard were to its specifications-in  partic- 
ular, to its version of the central bank reaction function-and  how the model 
would have to be modified to produce more believable outcomes. 
The third conclusion I want to comment on concerns the use of  a central 
bank reaction function that includes only the deviation of  inflation from its 
objective. This and other papers show that by  altering its response to inflation 
deviations, the degree of interest rate smoothing, and the length of the targeting 
horizon, a central bank using only an inflation forecast can come fairly close 
to replicating the results it would obtain by explicitly including output smooth- 
ing among its objectives. Still, it does not follow that excluding the output gap 
is appropriate. If  output smoothing is a legitimate goal of  central banks-if 
the public expects it in the context of  pursuing price stability-deviations  of 
output from potential ought to  be among the variables the central bank re- 
sponds to. Welfare losses are likely to be reduced, even if only by a little, and 
we cannot be certain that larger reductions would not be forthcoming under 
different model specifications. More fundamentally, I presume these reaction 
functions represent what the central bank talks about in its reports and testimo- 
nies. It is important for the public and financial markets to understand the cen- 
tral bank’s motives. Being explicit about output-smoothing goals and the role 
they play in policy adjustment should promote better policy making, more re- 
enforcing market reactions, and greater public understanding and support. 
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Haldane paper would be to different parameters and model structures, and un- 
certainties about the answers to such questions are the principal reasons why 
in practice monetary policymakers do not, at least consciously, commit to fol- 
lowing mles. 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members  are regularly given 
some information on the predictions from monetary policy rules. Among the 
material they receive before each committee meeting is a chart that shows his- 
toric and projected federal funds rates under the staff forecast relative to the 
results of two conventional backward-looking rules. One is the Taylor rule, the 
other an estimated version of that rule fitted over the 1987-96  period, including 
a gradual adjustment of the federal funds rate to its equilibrium level. Each rule 
is examined under a variety of output and inflation gap measures; alternative 
measures can make a significant difference in the readings for the federal funds 
rate.' For the estimated rule, members see a one-standard-deviation band re- 
lated to parameter uncertainty around the national target. Some individual mem- 
bers with a particular interest in rules receive other simulations or rule outcomes 
done both at the Board and the Reserve Banks. 
Members have used this information in two ways. One is as a benchmark for 
the stance of policy-how  is it positioned relative to past cormnittee responses 
to similar combinations of output and inflation gaps. It has also been used not 
so much as a guide to the precise numerical target for policy but to structure 
thinking about the implications of  incoming information for the direction of 
policy action. But, in truth, only a few members look at this or similar informa- 
tion regularly, and the number does not seem to be growing. I would like to 
take a few minutes to speculate on why this might be, and what general ave- 
nues research might take to make these exercises more useful. 
Members seem to regard the use of rules to guide policy as questionable in 
part because they are quite uncertain about the quantitative specifications of 
the most basic inputs required by most rules and model exercises. They have 
little confidence in estimates of  the size of  the output gap, the level of  the 
natural or equilibrium real interest rate, or even the level of  the actual real 
interest rate, since inflation expectations are at best only imperfectly observ- 
able. They see enough evidence of changes in the world around them to distrust 
the estimates of these variables that they get from history, whether that history 
is embodied in simple means, single-equation reaction functions, or complex 
empirical models.*  And as a consequence of  these changes, they do not see 
their past actions as a very firm guide to current or future policy. 
I. Deriving the results from alternative output and inflation gap measures raised some complex 
issues having to do with the consistency of  the natural real interest rate across inflation indexes 
and over time as relative trends in inflation measures shifted. 
2. To be sure, policymakers need to have judgments (at least implicitly) on these variables when 
they make discretionary policy decisions. But they are freer to allow the full range of recent infor- 
mation to affect these estimates, and they can calibrate their responses to these variables depending 
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Let’s look at the difficulties with estimating some of  these key variables, 
bearing in mind that what seem like small deviations in a historical context 
can loom very large to a policymaker considering a 25 or 50 basis point rate 
adjustment. One important source of  uncertainty about output gaps, and to a 
lesser extent inflation gaps, is data revisions. One of my colleagues finds sub- 
stantial differences, ranging up to 200 basis points in some quarters, between 
Taylor rules calculated with data available at the time the decision was made 
and those calculated with the series that exist several years later (Orphanides 
1998).  Among other things, such differences raise questions about the efficacy 
of  rules derived from revised data. The output gap is vulnerable to revisions 
and to uncertainties about the level of  potential output. Some revisions after 
the fact are based partly on the observation that actual inflation did not turn 
out close to projections based on previous estimates of the gap. These sorts of 
revisions can make policy that seemed at the time about in line with past expe- 
rience or a sensible response to the existing situation look very different when 
viewed in retrospect. Right now, the level and rate of growth of potential output 
is a major issue and  cause of uncertainty in policy deliberations. 
Estimates of the equilibrium real short-term rate of interest in effect embody 
all the information about the economy and economic relationships. They de- 
pend on the levels of  supply and demand in the economy, their interactions, 
the behavior of  other financial variables, and the responses of  spending and 
prices to these variables. Judging equilibrium real interest rates from simple 
historical averages is surely wrong, given shifts over time in key supply and 
demand factors, such as fiscal policy and the behavior of labor markets. Even 
inferences from more complex models that try to take account of many of these 
influences are suspect, in light of the necessarily limited amount of information 
they can incorporate and the evolution of underlying structures and relation- 
ships; for example, the decline of availability constraints in credit markets from 
the lifting of Regulation Q and the growth of credit securitization has probably 
raised equilibrium real interest rates over the last 20 years. 
The conference organizer is to be commended for placing some emphasis 
on dealing with uncertainty. But it is just a start. We  tend to treat each type 
of  uncertainty separately. An  investigator may  carefully address the risks of 
structural change and parameter uncertainty in one specific model. Yet another 
may consider the implications of not knowing which, among several different 
models, is a better representation of reality. But in fact different sources of 
uncertainty may interact in complex ways, and policymakers must face them 
and form judgments all at once. In addition, policymakers often face skewed 
notions of  uncertainty-if  a parameter has changed, it is more likely to be in 
a particular direction suggested by incoming data. Finally, the specification of 
the loss function itself may be uncertain. How can we be sure in a democracy 
that the utility of  the public can be represented by  a quadratic function-so 
important to  our certainty-equivalent results-or  that  the public  would  be 
equally averse to misses on both sides of targets under all circumstances. As 
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errors, I sense that additional research into the conduct of policy under uncer- 
tainty would be especially fruitful and welcome. 
So policymakers shy away from rule-based decisions because the rules as- 
sume they know too much. But rules can also be perceived as assuming pol- 
icymakers know too little. Policymakers use incoming information to assess 
the source and persistence of  specific shocks. Deviations from expectations 
are examined for clues as to whether they arise from the supply or demand 
sides of the economy and whether they are a consequence of a temporary dis- 
turbance to an unchanged underlying structure or represent a lasting alteration 
to parameter values or model structure. In this examination, policymakers use 
all available information, including much that is outside the structure of typical 
models. To the extent that they can reach a judgment on the most likely nature 
of the shock, they can modify the policy response to improve on the outcome 
of the rule. 
Of course, the authors of this paper and others would point out that all this 
information should be encompassed by  forecasts of inflation or output gaps, 
and that policymakers should just make their best guess about the future and 
act on it, perhaps modifying the trajectory of action to take account of parame- 
ter uncertainty. One reason policymakers might seem hesitant to take this ad- 
vice can be seen in figure 4C.1. It shows the central tendency of  the range 
of  projections by  FOMC members and Blue Chip panelists of  inflation and 
unemployment for each of the last few years. These forecasts were made at the 
middle of  the previous year, which comes fairly close to matching the four- 
to six-quarter-ahead forecasting horizon that falls out of  the Batini-Haldane 
simulations as close to optimal. 
As is readily apparent, both policymakers and private forecasters have per- 
sistently underestimated the strength of  aggregate demand and hence over- 
predicted the level of the unemployment rate, in the bottom panel. Nonethe- 
less, they have also consistently overpredicted inflation by substantial amounts. 
(Data that have become available since the conference confirm that these trends 
continued in  1998.) Apparently, the world has changed in some significant 
way-or  there has been an astounding series of  temporary supply shocks- 
and more quickly or persistently than policymakers or professional forecast- 
ers could anticipate. 
Naturally, as policymakers receive evidence that  their knowledge of  the 
structure of the economy is deficient, they have tended to reduce the weight 
they place on forecasts in making their decisions. In light of the many simula- 
tions, not including those of  Batini and Haldane, that show that backward- 
looking policy is almost as effective as forecast-based policy, perhaps this is 
not a problem. But I still harbor the suspicion that policymakers trying to look 
even a bit inaccurately into the future can produce superior outcomes. The 
private sector in this situation is likely to be at least as confused as the central 
bank, and hence its actions based on its expectations and forecasts also may 
not be stabilizing. And even backward-looking policy is hampered by ques- 
tions about what the output gap actually is or was. This circumstance suggests 3.5 
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to me another possible avenue of research, which would examine the interac- 
tions between uncertainty and the appropriate weight to be put on forecasts 
and incoming data. 
Finally, I would note that the behavior of asset markets-especially  financial 
asset markets-has  contributed substantially to uncertainty about the natural 
real rate of interest and to central bank decisions to deviate from past patterns 
of behavior. In these models and reaction functions, the natural rate of interest 
is an index for a broader array of financial conditions. Batini and Haldane add 
the exchange rate, which is essential, and others have included long-term in- 
terest rates in their models. But over the last 10 years, changes in credit avail- 
ability and equity prices have played key roles in determining the stance of 
monetary policy in the United States and elsewhere, for example, Japan. Incor- 
porating richer financial sectors in empirical models and thinking about inter- 
actions between asset prices and aggregate demand, inflation, and monetary 
policy would be another helpful direction to take. And fuller treatment of asset 
markets would open up another important issue-the  implications of divergent 
views between the central bank and private savers and investors, in contrast to 
the usual assumption of consistent views held by  both the private sector and 
the central bank. Such divergences are not unusual, and they find expression 
in actual asset prices that the central bank occasionally finds difficult to justify 
or understand, and that the central bank anticipates might be corrected at some 
point, with implications for output and prices. 
By noting the impediments to greater rule-based decision making in the cen- 
tral bank, and by suggesting a daunting research agenda, I do not want to leave 
the impression that the research in the Batini and Haldane paper and more 
generally at the conference isn’t quite productive for monetary policy making. 
Such research helps to establish theoretical and empirical structures for consid- 
ering the stance of policy. It pinpoints key variables that should be taken into 
account when policy is made, and it has something to say about how the size 
of  individual parameters might influence stabilizing monetary policy. It has 
already provoked some potentially useful debates concerning, for example, the 
role of forecasts in policy, the strength of policy responses, the place of output 
gaps in provoking policy actions, the rationale for strings of policy moves, and 
the effects of uncertainty. Systematic consideration of these issues and others 
will continue to be useful to policymakers. The Batini and Haldane paper is an 
interesting addition to this important literature. 
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Discussion Summary 
Andrew Levin noted that the results in both his paper with Wieland and Wil- 
liams  and the Rotemberg  and Woodford paper  presented  at the conference 
show that for closed economies, there does not seem to be much evidence that 
model-based inflation forecasts work better than current inflation, the current 
output gap,  and  the  lagged  interest  rate. The different  results  obtained  for 
closed and open economies can in part be explained by the high variance of 
exchange rate shocks in open economy models. The fundamental mechanism 
seems to be that forward-looking rules perform better than rules based on cur- 
rent variables in an environment with temporary shocks to inflation. This issue 
is also related to the length of the horizon considered. The simulation results 
of  all four models  in  the Levin, Wieland,  and Williams paper show that  a 
longer measure of inflation generally works better since temporary shocks are 
smoothed out automatically. The Batini and Haldane paper only considers one- 
quarter changes in the consumer price index which are very volatile. When 
four-, eight-, or twelve-quarter changes in prices are used, the advantages of 
using forecast-based rules disappear. 
Michael Woodford remarked that his paper with Rotemberg shows that pure 
forward-looking rules are far from being optimal. As already mentioned in the 
comment by  Donald  Kohn, the familiar intuition that important  lags in the 
effects of monetary policy require rules based on inflation and output forecasts 
does not work in models with a forward-looking private sector. The first reason 
for this, common to many models with forward-looking elements (e.g., Mc- 
Callum-Nelson and Rotemberg-Woodford), is that aggregate demand depends 
on the long rate of interest, that is, expectations of future short rates, rather 
than just the  current  short rate.  Therefore,  monetary  policy  has  to  change 
people’s expectations about future short rates, which is why backward-looking 
rules for the short rate are not necessarily bad. A second reason, specific to the 
Rotemberg-Woodford  model, is that there are lags in the aggregate demand 
equation that arise because agents have to use old information in deciding on 
their spending. For this reason, spending decisions do not depend on past inter- 
est rates but on past expectations of current interest rates leading to a lag in 
the effect of monetary policy. These lags do not have the same implication of 
wanting the short rate to respond to forecasts, since future aggregate demand 
does not depend on the current funds rate but on current expectations of future 
funds rates. According to this  setup, only the commitment  to changing  the 
federal funds rate in the future has an effect on aggregate demand. 
David Longworth noted that there is an underlying tension between the un- 
certainty of policymakers about the true model of the economy and their desire 
to include more variables like exchange rates and asset prices in the monetary 
policy reaction rule. Longworth also stressed that the Bank of England obtains 
a low variance in inflation without an exchange rate in the policy rule. 
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the forward-looking rules used in the paper. This might be related to the fact 
that  the paper looks at the United  Kingdom, whereas  for the United  States 
about two years seem appropriate. Mishkin also asked about the reasons why 
the Rudebusch and Svensson paper did not find these forward-looking  rules 
as successful as in the present paper. John Taylor asked why the Rotemberg- 
Woodford rule, or any rule of  interest rate smoothing, does not perform  well 
in the paper, even though it uses a forward-looking model. Murk Gertler sug- 
gested that a possible answer to these questions consisted in the exchange rate 
channel, which makes lagged inflation a better forecast of future inflation in a 
closed economy than in an open economy. This Page Intentionally Left Blank